June 5th, 2002, marks the 35th anniversary of the 1967 Six-Day War. The following information was adapted from the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise's "Myths and Facts", written by Mitchell Bard.  Additional information can be found at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mftoc.html.

Israel's military strike in 1967 was a war of self-defense.
A combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behavior and, ultimately, an act of war left Israel no choice but preemptive action.  To do this successfully, Israel needed the element of surprise.  Had it waited for an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic disadvantage.  While Egyptian President Gamal Nasser continued to make speeches threatening war, Arab terrorist attacks grew more frequent.  In 1965, 35 raids were conducted against Israel.  In 1966, the number increased to 41.  In just the first four months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched.

Meanwhile, Syria's attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967, during which Israeli planes shot down six Syrian MiGs.  Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union - which had been providing military and economic aid to both Syria and Egypt - gave Damascus information alleging a massive Israeli military buildup in preparation for an attack.  Despite Israeli denials, Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt.

On May 15, Israel's Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border.  By May 18, Syrian troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights.  Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force, stationed in the Sinai since 1956, to withdraw on May 16.  On May 22, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat.  This blockade cut off Israel's only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran. Israel's attack was a reaction to this Egyptian first strike.  President Johnson acknowledged as much after the war (June 19, 1967): "If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran would be closed.  The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations."

Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily.  "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel.  The Arab people want to fight," he said on May 27.  The following day, he added:  "We will not accept any...coexistence with Israel...Today the issue is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel...The war with Israel is in effect since 1948."  King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30.  Nasser then announced:  "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation.  This act will astound the world.  Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived.  We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations."  President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq joined in the war of words:  "The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified.  This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948.  Our goal is clear -- to wipe Israel off the map."  On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces.  Approximately 250,000 troops (nearly half in Sinai), more than 2,000 tanks and 700 aircraft ringed Israel.  By this time, Israeli forces had been on alert for three weeks.  The country could not remain fully mobilized indefinitely, nor could it allow its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to be interdicted.  Israel's best option was to strike first.  On June 5, the order was given to attack Egypt.

After just six days of fighting, Israeli forces broke through the enemy lines and were in a position to march on Cairo, Damascus and Amman.  A cease­fire was invoked on June 10. The victory came at a very high cost -- altogether, Israel lost 777 soldiers and 2,586 were wounded.  Had Israel waited for the Arabs to strike first, as it did in 1973, and not taken preemptive action, the cost would certainly have been much higher and victory could not have been assured.

Only after Jordan attacked Jerusalem did Israel attack Jordan.
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent a message to Jordan's King Hussein saying Israel would not attack Jordan unless Hussein initiated hostilities.  On June 5th a cluster of planes flying from Egypt to Israel was seen on King Hussein's radar screen.  The Egyptians convinced Hussein the planes were theirs, and he then ordered the shelling of West Jerusalem.  In fact, the planes were Israel's, and were returning from destroying the Egyptian air force on the ground.  Meanwhile, Syrian and Iraqi troops attacked Israel's northern frontier.  Had Jordan not attacked, the status of Jerusalem would not have changed during the course of the war.  Once the city came under fire, however, Israel needed to defend it, and, in doing so, took the opportunity to unify its capital once and for all.

Most of the Palestinians who fled the West Bank did so to avoid the war.
As a result of the Arab refusal to accept the 1947 U.N. partition of Palestine and the State of Israel, during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war as many as 700,000 Palestinians left their homes to avoid the on-going war, many at the urging of Arab leaders who promised that all who left would return after a quick Arab victory over the new Jewish state.

Many of the refugees lived in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.  In 1952, the UNWRA set up a fund of $200 million to provide homes and jobs for the refugees, but the funds were never used for that purpose.

After Jordan launched its attack on June 5, 1967 approximately 325,000 Palestinians living in the West Bank fled.  A Palestinian refugee who was an administrator in a UNRWA camp in Jericho said Arab politicians had spread rumors in the camp.  "They said all the young people would be killed.  People heard on the radio that this is not the end, only the beginning, so they think maybe it will be a long war and they want to be in Jordan."  Some Palestinians who left preferred to live in an Arab state rather than under Israeli military rule.  Members of various PLO factions fled to avoid capture by the Israelis.

Israeli forces ordered some of Palestinians to move for "strategic and security reasons."  In some cases, they were allowed to return in a few days, in others Israel offered to help them resettle elsewhere.  Nevertheless, more than 9,000 Palestinian families were reunited in 1967.  Ultimately, more than 60,000 Palestinians were allowed to return.

UN Resolution 242 and the Khartoum Resolution.
On November 22nd, 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, establishing the principles that were to guide the negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.  The resolution calls for peace and recognition of the "right of every nation to live free from threat within secure and recognized boundaries", in return for Israel's withdrawal "from territories" [not "all the territories", nor "the territories captured in the course of the recent hostilities."]  The Arab League, during its conference in Khartoum, on September 1st, 1967 adopted a resolution calling for the continued struggle against Israel.  By adopting the dictum of no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel, the Arab states appeared to have slammed the door on any progress towards peace.